@agenticprimitives/connect-auth

Part of Agentic Primitives — the open-source trust substrate for agentic applications: identity that can sign, authority checked at act time, evidence the owner carries. Developer kit · All packages

Credential ceremonies that resolve to a canonical identity — not the other way around.

Most auth SDKs make the credential the identity: lose the passkey, lose the account. connect-auth inverts that. Passkey, SIWE, and OAuth are ceremonies that prove control; the identity they resolve to is the Smart Agent address (ADR-0010). Session JWTs carry the SA address as primary subject — the credential is a signer claim only. So when a credential rotates (ADR-0011), the user signs back in as the same agent, with the same delegations, the same name, the same reputation. Identity persists; credentials rotate.

This package also defines the Signer interfaces (Signer, PasskeySigner, EOASigner, KMSSigner) that agent-account and delegation consume — the architectural contract that lets the whole stack swap signing backends without touching account or delegation code. Custodian add/remove belongs to custody, not here: this package never mutates a credential set, only resolves credential → SA.

Part of agenticprimitives — the trust substrate for the agent economy: one canonical Smart Agent identity with custody, delegation, naming, credentials, and audit evidence designed as one system.

Use This When

• You implement passkey signup/login (WebAuthn).
• You implement SIWE or Google OAuth sign-in.
• You mint or verify JWT cookie sessions and CSRF tokens.
• You need Signer interfaces for agent-account or delegation.
• You derive CREATE2 salt from stable user scope (deriveSaltFromEmail, etc.).

Do Not Use This For

• Smart Agent deploy, UserOps, or ERC-1271 account logic → agent-account.
• Enrolling / rotating custodians on an SA → custody.
• .agent names → agent-naming.
• Public AgentCard profiles → agent-profile.
• Delegation tokens or encrypted session rows → delegation.
• KMS backends → key-custody (implements KMSSigner).

Install

pnpm add @agenticprimitives/connect-auth

60-Second Quickstart

import { mintSession, verifySession } from '@agenticprimitives/connect-auth';
import * as passkey from '@agenticprimitives/connect-auth/passkey';

// In your HTTP handler (app wires cookies):
const { sessionClaims } = await passkey.completeSignup(req);
const cookieValue = mintSession(sessionClaims);
// sessionClaims MUST include canonical Smart Agent address as primary subject

import { deriveSaltFromEmail } from '@agenticprimitives/connect-auth';
import { AgentAccountClient } from '@agenticprimitives/agent-account';

// Salt from user scope — NOT from .agent name.
const salt = deriveSaltFromEmail(user.email, 0);

Main Concepts

• Credential: passkey, SIWE EOA, or OAuth identity — control facet, not the SA.
• Canonical SA: resolved after auth (custodian lookup); JWT primary subject.
• Signer: interface consumed by agent-account / delegation.
• JWT session: signed cookie session (distinct from delegation SessionRow).

See docs/concepts.md.

Auth Method Subpaths (Tree-Shakable)

• @agenticprimitives/connect-auth/passkey
• @agenticprimitives/connect-auth/siwe
• @agenticprimitives/connect-auth/google

How it's different from Privy, Dynamic, and Web3Auth

Hosted auth vendors give you login plus an embedded key, and the identity lives in their database — your users exist because the vendor's account table says so. Here the identity is an on-chain address that no auth provider can revoke, and this package is one composable layer over it:

• Framework-agnostic and stateless. No hosted dashboard, no database, no cookie I/O — your app wires HTTP routes and storage; this package handles the cryptographic ceremonies and JWT mint/verify.
• No key custody. It defines the KMSSigner interface; concrete signing backends live in key-custody. The auth layer never holds material it could lose.
• Login is not authority. A session JWT proves who signed in. What the agent may do is the delegation layer's job — scoped, revocable, on-chain-enforceable — not a side effect of holding a session.

Security Invariants

• JWT secrets never logged; CSRF origin exact-match.
• WebAuthn challenges one-shot.
• Salt derivation deterministic (keccak).

See docs/security.md and AUDIT.md.

Documentation Map

• docs/concepts.md — credential vs canonical SA.
• docs/cross-browser-secure-home-passkey.md — Chrome/Firefox + Windows Hello secure-home flow.
• docs/api.md — public API guide.
• docs/security.md — invariants.
• docs/troubleshooting.md — common errors.
• docs/migration.md — migration notes.
• CLAUDE.md — agent routing.
• spec.md — spec pointer.

Status

Testnet/pilot-ready. Production launch is gated on the public checklist in the root README — including third-party contract audit and governance key rotation. Track every security finding live in docs/audits/findings.yaml.

Validation

pnpm check:connect-auth
pnpm check:forbidden-terms

License

UNLICENSED.